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Monitoring of Corporate Groups by 
Independent Directors 
A. C. Pritchard* 
Abstract 
Both the United States and Korea have reformed their corporate governance in recent years 
to put increasing responsibilities on independent directors. Independent directors have been 
found to be an important force protecting the interests of shareholders when it comes time to make 
certain highly salient decisions, such as firing a CEO or selling the company. This article 
compares the role of independent directors in the US and Korean systems. I argue that the US 
may have placed regulatory burdens on independent directors that they are unlikely to be able to 
satisfy, given their part-time status. By contrast, in the chaebol system of Korea, independent 
directors may have a critical role to play in limiting self dealing by controlling shareholders. 
Given the dominance of these controlling shareholders in the Korean economy, independent 
directors will need strong backing to be ef ective in protecting the interests of public shareholders. 
Independent directors have become a popular "cure-all" in the United 
States for whatever the latest malady ailing the modem corporation happens 
to be. Whenever a corporation has found its way into the headlines as the . 
subject of the scandal du jour, it is overwhelmingly the case that it is the 
managers who are caught with their fingers in the till, having manipulated the 
numbers, rolling the dice with the shareholders' money, or otherwise abusing 
the trust of shareholders and other corporate constituencies. They are, after all, 
the ones in charge of the day-to-day operations of the company. All too 
frequently the managers, who have charged some outrageous perk to the 
corporation's bill, or who have relabeled an expense as a capital expenditure, 
are at the very top levels of the corporate hierarchy, perhaps even serving on 
• Frances and George Skestos Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I would like to 
thank the Korea Development Institute for financial support and participants at the Korea 
Development Institute Conference on the Corporate Governance of Group Companies, in 
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the board. Immunity from greed, fear, and other weaknesses of character are 
apparently not required to advance to the top of the corporate hierarchy. 
It is the venality at the very top that most offends. Given the lofty levels of 
compensation that CEOs in the United States typically receive, it is hard for 
the average person (or more importantly, the average politician) to understand 
the desire for further aggrandizement and reluctance to accept responsibility 
for poor performance. One suspects that sense of outrage at the abuse of trust 
is mirrored, and perhaps magnified, inside the boardrooms of the corporations 
caught up in the wrongdoing. The directors who have placed their confidence, 
and to some extent their reputations, in the hands of the CEO (who generally 
will also serve as chairman of the board) are likely to feel a sense of betrayal as 
well as outrage. The outside directors are probably not the last to know, but 
they may take the most personal offense at the abuse. 
How natural, then, is the instinct of policymakers confronted by corporate 
wrongdoing to want to harness that sense of betrayal and outrage inside the 
boardroom to make better citizens out of corporations and their officers. If 
onJy we could shift power from the inside directors to the outside directors, all 
would be well. The insiders, most offensively the CEO/Chair, may have been 
complicit in the wrongdoing. But as for the outside directors, generally the 
worst that can be said is that they did not know of the accounting shenanigans 
or outsized bet. Perhaps shifting power to the latter, relatively innocent group, 
· we could thwart the wrongdoing before it even gets started, or at least root it 
out before it begins to snowball into a major scandal. Conflict of interest is the 
problem, goes the story, so shifting authority to individuals whose judgment 
is unclouded by conflict will greatly reduce the embarrassing problems that 
keep appearing in the headlines. Agency costs will be kept in check by 
recruiting faithful agents as independent directors to monitor the insiders; 
politicians and bureaucrats will avoid the awkward questions that inevitably 
arise out of corporate scandal: "Why didn't you catch this sooner? Why 
wasn't there a law to prevent this? What are you going to do to help these 
investors who have lost all this money?" 
The American faith in independent directors appears to have attracted 
adherents globally - the long-term trend has been toward greater director 
independence around the world. I will focus here, however, on two countries: 
Korea and the United States. Both countries have turned to corporate 
governance reform in the wake of crises. For Korea, the impetus was an 
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economy-wide financial crisis that led to the intervention of the IMF in 1998. 
Weaknesses of corporate governance were widely perceived as exacerbating 
the financial shock to the Korean economy.1l 
In this regard, the recent Korean experience echoed the American 
experience with the market crash of October 1929, which was popularly 
blamed for the subsequent widespread economic hardship that accompanied 
the Great Depression. That episode led to the first federal securities laws in the 
United States, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934. Those laws created the essential framework of the securities regime that 
still governs in the U.S. In adopting those laws, however, the 1930's Congress 
generally avoided wholesale incursions into the internal governance of 
corporations, leaving that area generally for the states (with the limited 
exception of disclosure relating to proxies). For the United States, the impetus 
to corporate governance reform was the collapse of high-tech bubble, which 
saw the tech-laden Nasdaq index plunge from nearly 5000 to 2000 in a year's 
time.2l That collapse was accompanied by a salient scandal which fueled the 
drive to reform. A series of high-profile accounting imbroglios (e.g., Emon, 
Worldcom, Healthsouth, etc.), reflected any number of violations of existing 
disclosure and anti-fraud requirements. As a result, the U.S. has witnessed a 
number of criminal indictments and convictions for those disclosure 
violations. Prosecution, however, was not deemed a sufficient response 
(except perhaps by those indicted), so the accounting scandals have also 
produced a number of governance reforms which apply to the guilty and 
innocent alike. None of these reforms seem to have helped with the next crisis, 
which stemmed from inadequate risk management, perhaps fueled by poorly 
structured incentive compensation that rewarded executives of financial 
institutions for placing enormous wagers on the direction of the housing 
market. 
Korea is further along from its motivating financial crisis. It has made great 
strides during the intervening period in bringing its corporate governance 
requirements up to international standards. Korea, infected like other 
1) Hwa-Jin Kirn, Living with tlie IMF: A New Approach to Corporate Governance and Regulation 
of Financial Inst itutions in Korea, 17 BERKELEY J. lNTL L. 61, 69 (1999). 
2) The Nasdaq closed at 5,048.62 on March 10, 2000 and 1,923.38 on March 12, 2001, available 
athttp://finance.yahoo.com. 
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countries by the crisis in the U.S., must now face the question of whether it has 
renewed its appetite for governance reform. Are further reforms needed? If 
the answer is yes, does Korea have the political will to finish the job of 
reforming its governance standards? Has Korea done enough to prevent the 
fraud next time? 
The United States by contrast, already boasted governance standards -
arising from a combination of state corporate law, exchange listing standards, 
and best practices - that were among the most stringent in the world when it 
faced its spate of the accounting scandals. Nonetheless, those governance 
controls proved inadequate to prevent the sort of attention-getting frauds that 
typically lead to corporate and securities fraud reform. The regulatory 
backlash in the United States has led to the enactment of best practices as a 
matter of federal law in the hope that doing so will help prevent fraud in the 
future. Were those toughened standards needed, or were they overkill? Will 
the United States' rigorous new standards prevent the fraud next time? 
Obviously these two countries' reform drives have significantly raised 
governance standards in both countries. More interesting, perhaps, is the fact 
that the gap between the two has narrowed. Korean governance standards -
at least on paper - have many similarities to the standards now in place in 
the United States. This facial similarity between the governance regimes in the 
two countries overlooks one critical fact - the corporate environment varies 
dramatically between Korea and the United States. Although the Korean 
economy continues to be dominated by the chaebol groups of affiliated 
companies, the American economy is dominated by publicly-held companies 
with widely dispersed shareholders. One question raised by Korea's move to 
upgrade to international best practices is whether the practices appropriate for 
a country like the United States, which has very few controlling shareholders, 
can be translated into Korea's complex web of corporate groups. What 
implication does this wide divergence in the two countries' corporate environ­
ments have for determining the appropriate standards for corporate 
governance? Most importantly for purpose of looking at the role of outside 
directors, does independence have the same meaning and purpose in the 
context of a corporate group? Does the notion of independence need to be 
adjusted to fit into a group context? Should directors' independence be 
measured with respect to the group as a whole, or only with respect to the 
individual affiliated company within the group? 
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In Parts 1 and 2 of this paper, I discuss the current state of corporate 
governance in Korea and the United States and the recent changes to the two 
regimes. In Part 3, I compare the very different governance problems faced in 
those two countries and analyze whether the independent director is the 
answer to the problems faced in either c ountry. I conclude that t he 
independent director is unlikely to eliminate fraud and self-dealing from the 
American capital markets, as it proponents may have hoped. I also conclude, 
however, that the use of independent directors, if properly bolstered by other 
governance measures, could help mitigate the problems fostered by the 
chaebol system in Korea. 
Part 1: Corporate Governance in Korea 
1. The Dominance of the Chaebol 
The defining characteristic of corporate governance in Korea is the 
predominance of chaebols, a group of affiliated firms, which although they are 
legally independent, are nonetheless tied together by cross shareholdings.3l 
The group is commonly dominated by a controlling shareholder or family. 
Although common shares carry one vote per share in Korea (dual class shares 
are prohibited for now4l), the strategic use of cross ownership results in the 
controlling shareholder exercising voting power over the affiliated companies 
substantially greater than the controller's economic rights. Kim, Lim and Sung 
report a startling gap of median voting rights of 74.59 percent for controlling 
shareholders of chaebol firms, but only 12.95 percent median cash flow rights 
for those shareholders.5l 
3) Cross shareholding is not permitted between two firms, but this restriction is readily 
circumvented through the use of three or more firms. Sea Jin Chang, Ownership Structure, 
Expropriation, and Performance of Group-Affiliated Companies in Korea, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 238, 238 
(2003). 
4) SANGBEOP [KOREAN COMMEROAL CODE] art. 369-1. The Ministry of Justice has drafted 
legislation that would allow dual-class stock. 
5) Woochan Kirn et al., What Determines the Ownership S tructure of Business Conglomerates ?: 
On the Cash Flow Rights of Korea's Chaebol, ECG! - FINANCE WORKING PAPER No. 51/2004; KOi 
Sc:HooL OF Pus Poucv & MANAGEMENT PAPER No. 04-20 (2004), at 22, available at http://ssm.com/ 
abstract=594741. 
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In part to maintain this control, chaebol firms rely heavily on debt.6> Indeed, 
this is the principal benefit afforded by affiliation with the chaebol group: 
affiliated firms have greater access to financing than non-chaebol firms, the 
result of cross-debt guarantees among chaebol member firms.7l Moreover, the 
importance of the chaebol to the Korean economy means that they were 
historically "too big to fail," enjoying the implicit guarantee of a bailout from 
the government.8> That guarantee now appears to have been withdrawn, as 
evidenced by the demise of the Daewoo group. Perhaps the recently enacted 
prohibition of loans and guarantees to specially-related persons will put 
pressure on the chaebol to reduce their debt levels.9> The available evidence 
suggests that substantial improvement has been made already, with the debt 
load of the chaebol substantially reduced from where it stood at the time of the 
IMF crisis.10> 
2. Evidence on the Effect on Minority Shareholders 
Unfortunately, the benefits afforded by greater access to debt carries with 
it substantial costs for equity holders. The "separation of ownership and 
control" enjoyed by the controlling shareholders of the chaebol has important 
implications for minority shareholders in Korean firms. Although this 
separation of cash flow rights from control rights may reduce the cost of debt 
(perhaps because it aligns the interests of default-averse creditors with the 
interests of under-diversified controlling shareholders), it may also leave 
6) Jae-Seung Baek et al., Corporate Governance and Finn Value: Evidence from the Korean 
Financial Crisis, 71 J. FIN. ECON. 265, 267 (2004) (the average debt to total assets ratio in the top 30 
chaebol firms was 77.18% in 1993-1998). 
7) Hyun-Han Shin & Young S. Park, F inancing Constraints and Internal Capital Markets : 
Evidence from Korean 'Chaebols', 5 J. CoRP. FIN. 169, 172-73, 190 (1999). 
8) Curtis J. Milhaupt, Privatization and Corporate Governance in a Unified Korea, 26 J. CoRP. L. 
199, 207 (2000). 
9) Cross-debt guarantees of chaebol group companies are tightly regulated by law. 
DOKJEOMGYUJE MIT GoNGJEONGGEORAE E Gw ANHAN BEOPNYUL (KOREAN MONOPOLY REGULATION AND 
FAIR TRADE Acr], art. 10-2. I am indebted to Joon Park for this point. 
10) According to the analysis of the Financial Supervisory Service, the largest five chaebol 
groups reduced their average total liabilities-to-equity ratio from 352% (December 31, 1998) to 
125% (December 31, 2002); other chaebol groups reduced their average ratio from 427% 
(December 31, 1998) to 172% (December 31, 2002). 
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minority shareholders vulnerable to expropriation by controlling shareholders. 
The directors charged with protecting those minority shareholders are scant 
protection: "chaebol affiliates' boards of directors are generally filled with 
insiders and friends of chaebol families." 11) Thus, the discretion of the 
controlling shareholder is largely unchecked by the formal authority 
supposedly held by the board. 
There is considerable evidence of that controlling shareholders use that 
discretion to appropriate wealth from the minority. For example, minority 
shareholders in chaebol firms typically lose out when the firm makes an 
acquisition, but the controlling shareholder benefits.12) Controlling shareholders 
also appear to manipulate their ownership interests in group firms to 
concentrate their economic rights in the most profitable members of the 
group. 13) Conversely, controlling shareholders may reduce their equity 
exposure in group members firms that have provided debt guarantees to 
more risky firms within the group.14) So the greater access to debt that chaebol 
firms enjoy may again come at the expense of minority shareholders. 
This divergence between control and economic rights may also manifest 
itself in diminished profitability. Controlling shareholders in chaebol groups 
may be more concerned with avoiding losses to their under-diversified wealth 
than they are with maximizing the profits of the firms affiliated with the 
group. Minority shareholders, by contrast, are more likely to be fully 
diversified (and therefore effectively risk-neutral) and less likely to have 
equity holding in each of the members of the group. There is evidence that the 
ownership structure of the chaebol may hurt profitability. For example, Joh 
shows that chaebol firms experienced lower operating profits during the pre­
crisis period.15) Monitoring by the controlling shareholder appears to promote 
the interests of the group as a whole, not the firm for which the individual 
works. So top executive turnover in chaebol firms appears to be unrelated to 
11) Chang, supra note 3, at 241. 
12) Kee-Hong Bae et al., Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business 
Groups, 57 J. FIN. 2695, 2737 (2002). 
13) Kim et al., supra note 5, at 30; Chang, supra note 3, at 250. 
14) Chang, supra note 3, at. 242. 
15) Sung Wook Joh, Corporate Governance and Firm Profitability: Evidence from Korea before the 
Economic Crisis, 68 J. FIN. EcON. 2B7, 318-19 (2003); Terry L. Campbell & Phyllis Y. Keys, Corporate 
Governance in South Korea: The Chaebol Experience, 8 J. CoRP. FIN. 373, 389 (2002). 
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firm-level performance, whereas it is significantly related for non-chaebol 
firms.16) In addition, executive compensation correlates with stock-market 
returns and return on assets for non-chaebol firms, but there is no significant 
relation between these performance measures and executive compensation for 
chaebol firms, despite the fact that chaebol firms pay their executives more.17) 
Not surprisingly, the stock market appears to recognize this risk of abuse 
by the controlling shareholders of chaebol firms: Baek, Kang & Park find that 
firms in which the controlling shareholders' voting rights exceed his economic 
rights had significantly lower returns during Korea's financial crisis.18l By 
contrast, firms with the largest non-managerial blockholder concentration 
experience significantly greater stock returns during the crisis.19) These 
findings suggest that concentrated ownership is not the problem; it is the 
separation of control from cash flow entitlements. In addition, transparency 
helps mitigate the problem; firms with cross-listed ADRs (thereby subject to 
more stringent disclosure regimes) and firms with substantial foreign 
institutional investment also enjoyed significantly less negative returns.20l 
Monitoring of management by large investors - without the risk of 
expropriation by the controlling shareholder - benefits all of the investors. 
3. Reforming the Chaebols 
Reforming the corporate governance of the chaebols to discourage 
misappropriation from minority shareholders has been a principal focus of the 
government since the financial crisis of 1997-1998. The IMF and World Bank 
identified weak corporate governance as an important cause of the crisis. 21l 
16) Campbell & Keys, supra note 15, at 390. 
17) Takao Kato, Woochan Kirn & Ju Ho Lee, Executive Compensation, Finn Perfonnance and 
Chaebols in Korea: Evidence from New Panel Data, 15 PAOFJC-BASIN FIN. J. 36 (2007). 
18) Baek et al., supra note 6, at 310. Interestingly, the lower stock market returns of the 
chaebol firms were not matched by lower accounting profitability during the crisis - chaebol 
firms had greater profits (although the difference is not statistically sigrrificant) than their non­
chaebol counterparts. Id. at 307. 
19) Id. at 302. 
20) Id. This fact is noteworthy in light of the fact that the flight of foreign capital played an 
important role in exacerbating the effects of the financial crisis. Milhaupt, supra note 8, at 295, 
297. 
21) Joongi Kim, Recent Amendments to the Korean Commercial Code and Their Effects on 
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Prior to these reforms, 
Principal shareholders commanded all facets of corporate affairs, 
including board decisions, the selection of directors or auditors, and 
shareholder meetings. Principal shareholders single-handedly 
appointed directors and auditors. Candidates were selected from 
company employees, with one of the most important criteria being 
personal loyalty to the principal shareholders.22l 
Now, directors owe an explicit fiduciary duty to the corporation.23) In 
addition, thresholds have been lowered for the bringing of derivative suits 
and removing directors.24) The former change has resulted in a significant 
increase in the number of derivative actions.25l 
Large firms (i.e., those with assets greater than 2 trillion won) are singled 
out for especially stringent corporate governance requirements. Large firms 
must draw at least half of their directors from outside the firm, have an audit 
committee with at least two-thirds outside directors, and have a nominating 
committee for outside directors.26) Chaebol firms have also received special 
attention. Principal shareholders who act as de facto directors or otherwise 
influence company management now owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation, 
whether or not they serve formally as directors.27) Moreover, conflict of 
interest transactions involving the firms in the groups with more than 5 
trillion of total assets must be approved by the board of directors.28l There is 
evidence that a similar provision adopted by the SK Group in its articles of 
incorporation has been effective in preventing at least some overreaching by 
the controlling shareholder.29) It is worth noting that the provision in question 
may have been adopted as a result of pressure from foreign investors. 30) 
International Competition, 21 U. PA. J. !NTL ECON. L. 273, 275(2000). 
22) Id. at 279-80. 
23) KoREAN CoMMEROAL CODE, art. 382-3. 
24) Id., art. 385 & 403. 
25) Kirn, supra note 21, at 295. 
26) KoREAN CoMMEROAL CoDE, art. 542-8 & 542-1. 
27) Id., art. 401-2. 
28) KOREAN MONOPOLY REGULATION AND FAIR TRADE Acr, art. 11-2. 
29) Kirn, supra note 21, at 325. 
30) Id., at 324-25. 
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These requirements appear to have had some effect, as chaebol firms do not 
have significantly worse governance than other Korean firms.31l There is 
evidence that improvements in corporate governance have a real payoff -
Black, Jang, and Kim find that better corporate governance correlates with 
significantly greater market valuation.32l For example, having a majority of 
outside directors correlates with a roughly 40% greater share price.33l 
To summarize, the main challenge facing the Korean system of corporate 
governance is the predominance of the chaebol system. Korea has made great 
strides over the last few years to try and bolster the protections afforded to 
minority shareholders, but more must be done. I will tum to that topic in Part 
3. 
Part 2: Corporate Governance in the United States 
1. Dispersed Public Ownership 
The pattern of corporate ownership in the United States differs substantially 
from the one found in Korea. Controlling shareholders, while not unheard of, 
are the exception rather than the rule. The typical ownership pattern in the 
United States is one of dispersed public ownership, with no single shareholder 
holding more than a small percentage of the company's shares. The need for 
diversification and certain regulatory restrictions ensure that even institutional 
investors will not ordinarily hold more than a small bloc of shares in any one 
company. Moreover, cross-ownership is relatively rare. American companies 
own shares in other companies, but they are typically a joint venture between 
companies. More typically, a parent corporation will own 100% of the shares 
of a subsidiary, essentially obviating conflict of interest concerns, or different 
businesses within a corporation will simply be operated as separate operating 
divisions, without the formality of separate incorporation. (The downside of 
31) Bernard S. Black, Hasung Jang & Woochan Kirn, Predicting F irms ' Corporate Governance 
Owices: Evidence from Korea, 12 J. CoRP. FIN. 660, 677 (2006). 
32) Bernard S. Black, Hasung Jang & Woochan Kirn, Does Corporate Governance Predict F irms 
Market Values ? Evidence from Korea, 22 J. L. EcoN. & ORc. 366 (2006). 
33) Id. 
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the latter arrangement, of course, is that all of the company's assets will be 
placed at risk if one of the operating divisions sustains liabilities that it cannot 
satisfy on its own.) 
In this system of dispersed public ownership, the principal concern for 
abuse of power by those in control is. not the risk posed by controlling 
shareholders, but rather, the potential for overreaching by managers. Given 
the dispersion of ownership, the voting mechanism will only be a weak check 
on managerial abuse and incompetence. Managers (particularly CEOs) in 
practice have a great deal of say over who will be named to the company's 
board, so the ability of the shareholders to affect the company's direction 
through their power to elect directors will be diffuse at best. Recognizing these 
weaknesses in direct accountability to widely dispersed shareholders, the 
corporate governance regime in the United States aims to protect the interests 
of largely powerless shareholders from overreaching by managers. 
Controlling shareholders are a concern, but a secondary one. The principal 
role of independent directors in the corporate regime of the United States is to 
restrain the CEO and other managers. 
2. Evidence on the Effect of Independent Directors 
What does the available evidence from the United States show about the 
success of independent directors in restraining managers? Most notably, on 
the subject presumably of greatest interest to shareholders, there is no 
evidence to show that more independent boards correlate with better firm 
performance.34) So shareholders cannot rely on independent directors to 
bolster the bottom line. This should hardly be surprising - if outside directors 
were a magic elixir, somehow boosting corporate performance, we would 
hardly need governance mandates to encourage greater board independence. 
Companies would bring more independent directors on board purely out of 
self-interest. 
Independent directors do appear to have an effect, however, at certain 
critical junctures for the corporation. Those junctures arise when the board is 
34) Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long­
Tenn Finn Perfonnance, 27 J. CoRP. L. 231, 259 (2001). 
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asked to make certain high stakes decisions. Being an outside director has 
historically been a part-time job, but at times it can capture the director's full­
time attention. More independent boards are more likely to replace the CEO 
after a period of poor performance.35> Tilis finding suggests that independent 
directors take this paramount monitoring task seriously. Turning to other 
salient situations likely to capture the focus of independent directors, more 
independent boards generally extract higher takeover premia in takeovers. 36) 
Companies adopting "poison pill" shareholder rights plan experience a 
positive stock price reaction if their board is majority independent, but a 
negative reaction otherwise.37> What explains these findings relating to 
takeovers? Perhaps more independent boards limit the ability of target 
company managers to extract side payments from potential acquirers, which 
the pill may facilitate. On the other side of the fence, acquiring companies 
announcing takeovers experience less of a drop in their stock price if they have 
a majority of independent directors.38> Independent directors may check 
excessive managerial optimism and a penchant for empire building. 
These findings that independent directors guide salient decisions are 
promising. The evidence on whether more independent directors contribute 
to more accurate financial reporting, however, is mixed. On the one hand, 
board independence does not appear to have any significant effect on a 
company's exposure to securities fraud class actions, one of the principal 
unfortunate consequences stemming from inaccurate financial reporting in 
the United States.39> On the other, there is evidence that weak governance, 
including a lack of board independence, is associated with enforcement 
actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission.40> This finding is 
35) Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN. EcoN. 431, 458 (1988). 
36) James F. Cotter et al., Do Independent Directors En/Janee Target S/Jare/Jolder Wealth During 
Tender Offers?, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 195, 216 (1997). 
37) James A. Brickley et al., Outside Directors and t/Je Adoption of Poison Pills, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 
371, 388 (1994). 
38) John W. Byrd & Kent A. Hickman, Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers? Evidence from 
Tender Offer Bids, 32 J. FIN. EcoN. 195, 219 (1992). 
39) Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Do t/Je Merits Matter More? The Impact of t/Je Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act, 23 J. L. ECON. & 0RG. 627, 642 n.14 (2007). 
40) Patricia M. Dechow et al., Causes and Cansequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis 
of Firms S ubject to Enforcement Actions by t/Je SEC, 13 CoNTEMP. Acer. RFS. 1, 21-22 (1996); Mark S. 
Beasley, An Empirical Analysis of t/Je Relation Between t/Je Board of Direc tor Composition and 
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confirmed in a study looking at a broader range of fraudulent behavior.41) 
These studies, however, rely on data that may have little bearing on current 
practice because governance practices in the United States have considerably 
less variation today than they did ten to twenty years ago. Virtually all of the 
boards of American public companies are now "above average," at least when 
compared with the governance practices of a generation ago. 
3. Reforming the Role of Independent Directors 
The corporate governance reforms in the United States have not been 
directed toward areas in which independent directors have been shown to 
have a positive influence on shareholder returns. Instead, the reforms are 
pinned to the hope that independent directors can encourage more accurate 
financial reporting. That focus reflects the scandals that give rise to the 
impetus for reform. The reforms came in response to a series of accounting 
scandals at large public companies, most notably Enron, Worldcom, Adelphia 
and Tyco. Unlike Korean crisis of 1997-1998, the stock market decline that 
accompanied these headlines of scandal did not have any appreciable effect 
on the overall economy. Notwithstanding the limited economic impact of 
these scandals, the widespread wrongdoing at those prominent firms raised 
concerns that it might reflect a broader pattern of misleading financial 
statements and self-dealing. Among the concerns raised were: (1) the 
perception that managers focused too narrowly on showing earnings growth 
from quarter to quarter, which may have created a temptation to shade the 
numbers in order to show that growth; (2) the closely-related concern that 
incentive-based compensation, which was supposed to align managers' 
interests with those of shareholders, again may have tempted managers to 
play fast-and-loose with accounting-based measures of performance; and (3) a 
limited form of self-dealing involving not related-party transactions of the sort 
seen in the chaebol, but instead enormous pay packages to managers, 
seemingly unchecked by too quiescent independent directors. 
Financial S tatement Fraud, 71 THE Acer. REv. 443, 463 (1996). 
41) Hatice Uzun et al., Board Composition and Corporate F raud, 60 FIN. ANALYSfS J. 33, 41 
(2004). 
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Politicians quickly stepped in to exploit the opportunity created by this 
very public airing of corporate dirty laundry. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
was the political response to the accounting crisis in the United States.42> Not 
surprisingly, given that the impetus for legislation arose out of accounting 
problems, the governance reforms adopted in response to the accounting 
scandals revolve around the relation of public companies to their external 
auditors. Those external auditors were perceived to be lacking in the 
independence. A variety of restrictions were adopted to foster auditor 
independence; the reform involving the board was to make the external 
auditors solely accountable to independent directors. 
Although anxious to be seen " doing something" about corporate 
misbehavior, Congress took pains to avoid responsibility for the details of the 
reforms to be adopted. Instead of requiring that audit committees be made up 
solely of independent directors, Congress instead directed national securities 
exchanges to adopt listing standards requiring wholly-independent audit 
committees.43> The distinction between laws and listing standards is largely 
cosmetic, given that changes in listing standards are subject to approval by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. In effect, the delegation of this task to 
the exchanges was a de facto takeover of an important aspect of corporate 
governance from state corporate law (its traditional domain in the American 
system). The takeover was done, however, with a self-regulatory veneer, 
useful because the exchanges have imposed governance standards, of varying 
degrees of intrusiveness, for decades.44> Those listing standards now require 
not only that all members of the audit committee be independent (as directed 
by Congress), but also require that those members be "financially literate" or 
possess "financial sophistication."45> Sarbanes-Oxley also requires that the 
independent audit committee have exclusive authority over the retention and 
compensation of auditors.46> Auditors also must report to the audit committee 
material accounting decisions.47> Finally, the law establishes "whistle-
42) Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
43) Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
44) Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-47654 (April 25, 2003). 
45) NYSE Listed Company Manual§ 303A.07; Nasdaq Rule 4350(d)(2). 
46) Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 301, supra note 43. 
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blowing" procedures for employees to report concerns about accounting to 
the audit committee. 48l 
The requirement of the independent audit committee supplements the 
requirement that the board of directors have a majority of independent 
directors. Both the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq listing standards 
now mandate that independent directors predominate.49l In and of itself this 
requirement is uncontroversial, but the definition of independence is  
circumscribed by a number of  relationships with the companies which are 
specified as inconsistent with independence.50l 
A more direct challenge to the power of the CEO is reflected in changes in 
the selection of directors. Nomination of directors is placed in the hands of 
independent directors: the NYSE requires a nominating committee consisting 
solely of independent directors, while the Nasdaq allows a choice between 
such a committee and nomination by a majority of the independent directors 
serving on the board as a whole.51l The exchanges split similarly on the 
question of CEO compensation: the NYSE requires a compensation committee 
consisting solely of independent directors, while the Nasdaq again gives a 
choice between such a committee and allowing a majority of independent 
directors to determine compensation.52l The division between the NYSE and 
Nasdaq reflects the difficulty that some smaller companies, largely con­
centrated on the Nasdaq, may have in finding enough qualified independent 
directors to serve all the mandated committees. The requirements relating to 
CEO compensation probably codify, in large part, existing practice: CEO 
compensation would be subject to entire fairness review by the courts if not 
ratified by the independent directors. 
All of these committee requirements have put substantial new 
responsibilities on independent directors; compliance with all of these new 
requirements has forced independent directors to work more. Not 
surprisingly, companies have been forced to pay correspondingly more for 
47) Id., § 204. 
48) Id., § 301. 
49) NYSE Listed Company Manual§ 303A.01; Nasdaq Rule 4350(c)(l). 
50) NYSE Listed Company Manual§ 303A.02(a); Nasdaq Rule 4200(a)(15). 
51) NYSE Listed Company Manual§ 303A.04(a); Nasdaq Rule 4350(c)(4)(a). 
52) NYSE Listed Company Manual§ 303A.05(a); Nasdaq Rule 4350(c)(3)(a). 
16 I Journal of Korean Law Vol. 9: 1 
independent directors' services.s3) The trend is unlikely to abate; the recent 
subprime crisis has brought calls for a greater role by independent directors in 
risk management.54) Given these greater responsibilities, boards may have to 
expand to accommodate the greater work load. Expansion of the board, 
however, may be bad news for investors, as larger boards correlate with 
weaker firm performance.ss) 
Part 3: The Role of Independent Director in Korea and the 
United States 
1. Korean and United States' Independent Directors Compared 
The table below summarizes the recent reforms relating to independent 
Board 
Audit 
Committee 
Korea 
> 50% independenflil 
Required 
67% outside directors and non­
outside director member must 
satisfy statutory independence 
tesf8l 
Must have at least one finance 
or accounting experf9) 
United States 
> 50% independents?) 
Required 
100% independent directors(J()) 
Must possess "financial 
sophistication" or "financial 
literacy"61) 
Auditors must report to audit 
cornrnittee62) 
53) Towers Perrin, Compensat ion for Corporate Directors Rose Modestly in 2008, available at 
http://www.towersperrin.com/ tp / showdctmdoc.jsp?country=global&url=Master_Brand_2/U 
SA/News/Monitor/2009/200910/mon_article_200910c.htm (reporting decline in director 
compensation in 2008 after yearly increases of 10% ). 
54) Press Release, National Association of Corporate Directors Launches Campaign to 
Strengthen Corporate Governance (Mar. 24, 2009), available at www.nacdonline.org/ 
DirectorChallenge. 
55) David Yerrnack, Higher Market Valuation of Cnmpanies with a Small Board of Directors, 40 J. 
FIN. ECON. 185, 209 (1996). 
56) KOREAN COMMEROAL CODE, art. 542-8. 
57) NYSE Listed Company Manual§ 303A.01; Nasdaq Rule 4350(c)(l). 
58) KOREAN COMMEROAL CODE, art. 542-11 & 415-2. 
59) Id., art. 542-11. 
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Korea United States 
Nominating Required for outside directors Required 
committee � 50% independent63l 100% independent directors on 
committee or majority of 
independent directors64l 
Compensation Not required Required 
committee 100% independent directors or 
majority of independent 
directors65l 
Related-party Board approval required66l Independent directors' approval 
transactions Loans and guarantees prohibited required (otherwise subject to 
(except for certain lirni ted legal challenge )67) 
circumstances) Loans to officers prohibited68) 
Cumulative Required absent opt out in charter; Permissible, but not required 
voting many firms have opted out69l and not common70l 
directors for large, public firms in Korea and the United States discussed 
above. 
Placing the two countries reforms side-by-side in the chart highlights the 
fact that Korea's corporate governance provisions, by and large, have more in 
common with the requirements in the United States than differences. One 
might conclude from this overall similarity, and given their relative states of 
capital market development, that both countries have adopted roughly 
appropriate models of corporate governance. I would argue, however, that 
the opposite conclusion is warranted: given their relative states of capital 
60) NYSE Listed Company Manual§ 303A.07(b); Nasdaq Rule 4350(d)(2). 
61) Id. 
62) NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.07(a). 
63) KOREAN COMMERGAL CODE, art. 542-8. 
64) NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.04(a); Nasdaq Rule 4350(c)(4)(a). 
65) NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.OS(a); Nasdaq Rule 4350(c)(3)(a). 
66) KOREAN COMMERGAL CODE, art. 542-9. 
67) NYSE Listed Company Manual§ 307.00; DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144; N. Y. Bus. CoRP. 
LAw § 713; CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 310. 
68) Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 402, supra note 43. 
69) KOREAN COMMERGAL CODE, art. 542-7. 
70) See MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 7.28 comt. Statutory comparison (2008). 
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market development, Korea requires more stringent corporate governance 
mandates than does the United States. Korea cannot be content to follow the 
American lead in corporate governance if it hopes to attain the depth and 
liquidity of the American capital. 
1. The Path Forward for Independent Directors in Korea 
Korea's public companies continue to be dominated by the chaebol; that 
dominance is unlikely to end any time soon. As a result, the chaebol are the 
face of Korean companies for many potential investors. As the research 
discussed in Part 1 demonstrates minority shareholders in those firms face 
very substantial risks of expropriation by the controlling shareholder. They 
face an even more substantial risk that the chaebol group will be managed to 
minimize the losses to the controlling shareholder. Potential investors have 
good grounds to be wary of placing their money in the hands of the 
controlling shareholders. 
The combination of chaebol dominance and controlling shareholder abuses 
means that the chaebol present a difficult 11 chicken-and-egg" problem for 
Korean reformers. On the one hand, the available evidence suggests that the 
shareholders of the chaebol companies would benefit the most from 
improvements in corporate governance. Korea cannot encourage a culture of 
investor confidence in Korean companies (with the attendant benefits that this 
would create for economic growth) without taming the power of the 
controlling shareholders of the chaebol and protecting minority shareholders 
from their overreaching. Chaebol shareholders, as a group, would be better off 
if governance were improved, but the benefits would accrue primarily to 
minority shareholders at the expense of controlling shareholders. Thus, 
controlling shareholders, anxious to preserve their substantial discretion, are 
likely to pose a substantial obstacle to further reform. As a result of their 
wealth and central role of their businesses in the Korean economy, the 
controlling shareholders exercise tremendous influence in policy discussions. 
Slicing this Gordian knot to promote a system that facilitates the confidence of 
minority investors is the central challenge facing Korean regulators today. 
Can the knot be cut? Unfortunately, the answer to this critical question is: 
"Not overnight." Moreover, the task will take considerable political will. The 
hope is that independent directors may be the 11 camel's nose under the tent" 
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that eventually brings true transparency and accountability in Korea's 
corporate boardrooms. The power of independent directors will need to be 
bolstered, however, to achieve this end. But any increase in the power of 
independent directors is likely to draw opposition from the controlling 
shareholders of the chaebol. To overcome that opposition, Korean reformers 
must strategically take advantage of the periodic opportunities for reform -
created by financial crisis and scandal - to press for further power in the 
hands of boards dominated by independent directors. Every incident in which 
a controlling shareholder is publicly disgraced is an opportunity for further 
reform. 
The governance reforms already adopted in Korea are critical first steps. 
Much reliance is placed, however, on independent directors to ensure that 
these reforms translate into actual protection for minority shareholders. To 
achieve this goal, independent directors need to be independent in more than 
just name. At a minimum, independent directors need to be independent of 
other members of the chaebol group, in addition to independent of the 
company on whose board they serve. The current rule is that independent 
directors cannot be employees of affiliated companies of the chaebol group.71l 
They are not barred, however, from service as directors for chaebol affiliates.72l 
Service as a director might not be thought to be sufficient to compromise 
independence. The fees paid to directors are, after all, relatively modest when 
compared to the typical directors' wealth and income. So one might perhaps 
conclude that service as a director of an affiliated company should not be 
deemed to compromise independence. On the other hand, directors owe a 
duty to each of the companies on whose boards they serve, and in the chaebol, 
these duties are likely to come into conflict. 
The problem, however, may go deeper than a conflict of interest or legal 
duty, either perceived or real. What is needed is a counter to controlling 
shareholders' manipulation of transactions among the chaebol affiliated 
companies. From this perspective, an independent director loyal to the group, 
rather than the individual company, is not likely to help. The independent 
director must be independent from the group in order to be fully independent 
71) KOREAN COMMEROAL CODE, art. 382. 
72) Id. 
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from the controlling shareholder. To be sure, this will impose costs on group 
cohesiveness, but that is the point. If the controlling shareholder wants a free 
hand to transfer assets among affiliated companies, the companies should be 
merged, or the minority shareholders should be bought out and the structure 
changed to a parent/ subsidiary one with 100% ownership. Requiring 
independent directors for all members of the group imposes a tax on an 
interlocking corporate structure that has been shown to harm minority 
shareholders. Controlling shareholders can avoid this tax by moving to a 
holding company structure, which would carry with it substantially improved 
transparency. 73) 
Finding enough independent directors for all group companies will not be 
easy. A more daunting challenge for reformers, however, is cultural rather 
than legal. It will take time for Korea to develop a culture of independence 
necessary for outside directors to have the desired effect on management. The 
institution of independent directors is starting from a very low level: 
Korea has no tradition of active discussion within the Board of 
Directors, and experience with independent directors has been limited. 
Most have been lawyers, accountants, academics and retired govern­
ment officials. Concerns have been expressed about the effective 
independence of many independent directors and about their lack of 
business experience. Newly-appointed directors often complain about 
lack of access to the information they consider necessary for informed 
decision-making.74) 
This cultural weakness suggests that reformers must take stronger formal 
steps to ensure that independent directors are tough-minded defenders of the 
interests of all shareholders. It is worth considering whether the roles of CEO 
and C hairman should be separated to provide a stronger voice for the 
independent directors in the boardroom. 
Another mechanism to bolster independent directors as monitors is to 
73) Hwa-Jin Kirn, The Case for Market for Corporate Control in Korea, 8 J. KOREAN L. '22.7, 248 
(2009) (discussing reorganization of SK Corporation in response to a hostile takeover attempt). 
74) Bernard S. Black et al., Corporate Governance in Korea at the Millennium: Enhancing 
International Competitiveness, 26 J. CORP. L. 537, 557 (2001). 
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strengthen the role of institutional investors. The role of independent directors 
could be greatly enhanced if shareholders were to take advantage of the 
provision allowing shareholders holding at least one percent of the company's 
shares to nominate candidates for director.75l Unfortunately, one weakness 
currently limiting the effectiveness of institutional investors in Korean 
corporate governance is that many Korean institutions are affiliated with the 
chaebol and as a result provide little in the way of independent monitoring.76l 
One avenue for overcoming this problem is to encourage foreign institutions 
to take larger positions in Korean companies. Such institutions are ac­
customed to standards of corporate transparency substantially greater than 
those currently practiced in most Korean companies. To be effective in 
demanding transparency, however, these institutions will want some 
assurance of representation in the boardroom. For this reason, restrictions on 
share ownership for outside directors should be repealed.77J Ownership of 
shares - if less than a controlling stake - is a powerful incentive to work 
hard on behalf of minority shareholders. In addition, the provision of the 
Korean Commercial Code [Sangbeop] allowing companies to remove 
cumulative voting through their charter provision should be repealed.78l 
Many companies have taken advantage of this position to eliminate the threat 
posed to the controlling shareholder's power by institutional investors, thus 
rendering the cumulative voting provision ineffective.79l There are now limits 
on controlling shareholders voting their shares to remove cumulative voting.80l 
These limits also apply to undoing the charter provisions that already restrict 
cumulative voting.81l But who will initiate such a change? For outside 
investors to have an effective voice in the direction of the company, cumulative 
voting should be mandatory for the foreseeable future. 
Cumulative voting would give institutions real clout in determining who 
75) KOREAN COMMERCIAL CODE, art. 542-6. 
76) Black et al., supra note 74, at 552. 
77) KOREAN COMMERCIAL CODE, art. 542-8; 5ANGBEOP 5IHAENGRYUNG (KOREAN COMMERCIAL CODE 
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE], art. 13. 
78) KOREAN COMMERCIAL CODE, art. 382-2. 
79) Bernard S. Black, The Role of Self-Regulation in Supporting Korea's Securities Markets, 3 J. 
KOREAN L. 17, 27 n.9 (2003). 
80) KOREAN COMMERCIAL CODE, art. 542-7. 
81) Id. 
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the independent directors will be. Setting the agenda for voting is also 
important. Although (as I discuss below) it is difficult to justify the inclusion of 
any inside directors on the audit committee, the inclusion of inside directors 
on the nominating committee raises a more problematic question. Including 
inside directors on this committee may help ensure that the outside directors 
chosen are a good "fit." But if insiders choose the outsiders, how closely will 
the board scrutinize the conduct of the insiders? Here the conflict between the 
board's role as a team decision-maker and its role as a monitor is particularly 
acute. I think, however, that in the context of Korea's controlling shareholder 
dominated corporate governance, the incremental independence that might 
result is worth the loss in board solidarity. As transparency and accountability 
increase, this question might need to be rethought. 
The role of the audit committee also should be broadened and its 
independence bolstered. The requirement that boards approve related-party 
transactions over a certain size threshold is a step in the right direction. 82) The 
dynamics of the board room, however, and the desire to get along with one's 
fellow board members, make this provision less effective than is needed. 
Given the pervasiveness of related-party transactions among chaebol members 
and the evidence that such transactions are manipulated to benefit controlling 
shareholders, stronger medicine is needed. Related-party transactions should 
require approval of the company's audit committee, not the board. Moreover, 
the audit committee should be made up exclusively of independent directors. 
(Some firms have already taken an essentially equivalent step by creating 
related party transaction review committees consisting exclusively of outside 
directors.83) This approach may be preferable if there are concerns with 
demanding too great a time commitment from outside directors.) The audit 
committee, if properly empowered and staffed by the right people, is 
potentially the single most effective mechanism for protecting the rights of 
minority shareholders against overreaching by controlling shareholders and 
managers. The internal auditor, as an employee of the firm, should report to 
the audit committee, but should not be part of that committee, particularly if 
the audit committee's responsibilities are expanded. Putting insiders in the 
82) Id., art. 542-9. 
83) Kirn, supra note 21, at 275. 
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audit committee's meeting room, even if they meet statutory tests for 
independence, can only dampen the vigorous independence that is needed 
there. Giving the independent directors the separate space afforded by a 
relatively autonomous audit committee may well encourage a certain 
solidarity among them, and corresponding willingness to stand together to 
make tough decisions in the face of demands from strong-willed controlling 
shareholders. This monitoring role could be further enhanced by requiring 
that the company pay the reasonable expenses of advisors - accountants, 
lawyers, etc. - for the audit committee.84l 
3. Independent Directors in the United States: The Path Forward ? 
If Korea would be well served by giving independent directors more 
power, does it necessarily follow that the United States is equally well served? 
The new independence requirements for boards that have been adopted in the 
United States put the tension between the two roles of corporate boards in 
stark contrast. One vision of the role of the board - call it the "cooperative" 
model - sees independent directors as part of a team that helps devise 
business strategy, offer the CEO and other managers useful advice based on 
extensive business experience, and provides useful business contacts that help 
promote the firm's profitability. The cooperative model sees outside directors 
as useful because they broaden the range of expertise and experience available 
to firm decision-making. The other vision of the role of the board - call it the 
"adversarial" model - sees directors, particularly those independent of 
management, as monitors of management, charged with uncovering self­
dealing, fraud, other forms of malfeasance, and now, excessive risk taking. 
The adversarial model sees outside directors as useful because they bring 
vigilant suspicion to bear on management's activities. One suspects that the 
vigilant "monitor" is not much of a "team" player. Moreover, one can have 
doubts about who is benefiting from the monitoring. Is it the shareholders of 
the firm, disabled by collective action problems from monitoring on their 
own? Or is it the regulators, attempting to leverage their enforcement 
resources by conscripting agents inside the firm to ensure that the corporation 
84) Black et al., supra note 74, at 563. 
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lives up to its social responsibilities? If shareholder voting does not suffice to 
ensure that directors will monitor on behalf of shareholders in the way that 
government regulators believe that they should, the theory goes, perhaps 
other (more intrusive) mechanisms can help ensure that directors do their job. 
The tension between the independent director's twin roles - advisor and 
monitor - is inevitable. In the fervor of reform frenzy, it is easy to lose sight of 
the important role that independent directors can play in making the business 
more profitable. No one expects the board of directors to actively manage the 
company, but the directors may have an important (non-monitoring) role to 
play in developing an overall strategy and vision for the corporation. Despite 
the emphasis that regulators put on the role of directors in ensuring the 
corporation's managers comply with the law, independent directors typically 
are chosen on the basis of their business expertise, not their monitoring 
capabilities. So CEOs of other companies are several times more likely than 
lawyers to serve on the boards of public companies.85l One assumes that it is 
not because the CEOs are more vigilant monitors. The experience of top-level 
management is apparently more valuable in devising business strategy than 
the instruction provided in law school. Deputizing independent directors as 
corporate cops inside the boardroom may have very real costs in the ability of 
the board to help guide the business. The United States needs to worry about 
how it may be undermining board effectiveness by fostering too much of an 
adversarial relationship between independent directors and management; 
Korea has far to go before this will be a concern. 
These costs might be worth paying in the United States if enhanced 
independence was likely to substantially reduce the incidence of fraud and 
self-dealing, as it may do in Korea. But the United States is starting from a 
much lower incidence of fraud and self-dealing than Korea (and most other 
countries in which controlling shareholders dominate public companies). 
Dispersed share ownership - and the corporate disclosure that promotes 
such ownership - is the norm in the United States. There is a culture of 
accountability by corporate managers to the market, as well as the board, that 
serves as the background for policy efforts to discourage fraud and self­
dealing. Fraud and greed will always be with us; closing off one avenue 
85) Stephen P. Ferris et al., Too Busy To Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with 
Multiple Board Appointments, 58 J. FIN. 1087, 1094 (2003). 
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simply pushes the fraudsters and the greedy to find another weakness in the 
system. The quest for regulatory perfection is illusory, but the costs of that 
quest - which ultimately will be paid by the shareholders who are supposed 
to benefit from regulation - will be all too real. 
Part 4: Conclusion 
My focus in this paper has been on the convergence between Korea and 
the United States on the role of independent directors in corporate 
governance. Korea has come a long way toward the United States model in 
the last few years as it responded to a devastating financial crisis, even as the 
United States raised the bar still higher in response to a corporate crisis of its 
own. For this effort, Korean reformers are to be congratulated. 
Unfortunately, there is still work to be done in Korea. The self-dealing and 
lack of transparency of the chaebol are the principal impediments to a culture 
of investor confidence in Korea. Independent directors - preferably selected 
by institutional investors - can play an important role in making the changes 
that are needed. To do so, however, their independence must be further 
strengthened. 
The United States, by contrast, now risks overdosing on independence. 
Independence facilitates monitoring, but it discourages the trust and candor 
that are essential to building an effective team. Independence, therefore, 
should be deployed with caution, and not as the cure-all for the latest scandal 
to catch the attention of politicians. Time will tell whether the United States 
has used the appropriate caution in adopting its latest governance reforms. 
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